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Abstract 
 
Corporate failures and financial crises periodically lead to speculation and critique of 
the Big Four in the UK. Wide-reaching regulatory changes and reforms have emerged 
as a consequence, yet the overall dominance of the large accounting firms remains an 
immutable truth. This paper explores the dominance of the Big Four drawing on 
Bourdieu’s rich system of thought, and in particular the role of symbolic productions, 
and how symbolic power and symbolic violence are deployed to secure the social 
integration of an arbitrary order. We document the social mechanisms of symbolic 
domination that secure the Big Four’s position in the social structure of professional 
accounting firms. We identify a circular system of double-structured domination, 
where three mechanisms of euphemised discourse, rites of institution and socialisation 
normalise symbolic systems and disabling constraints for smaller firms. In addition to 
interviewing informants working in the field, this paper examines recent political 
challenges that have placed the role of the Big Four and their domination under 
increasing scrutiny. These challenges bring into focus issues of recognition and 
resistance to symbolic modes of domination, and we contemplate the impact of such 
discourses on the dynamics of the UK accounting field, and the Big Four’s continued 
influence. 
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1. Introduction 
… at the end of a period of development characterized, particularly, by a 
long series of mergers and a profound transformation of corporate 
structures, we see that… the struggle is confined to a small number of 
powerful competing firms which, far from passively adjusting to a 
‘market situation’, are able to shape that situation actively. (Bourdieu, 
2005: 201) 
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In the UK, the Big Four have continued to consolidate their positions and to 
dominate the field of professional services performed by accounting firms, in terms of 
both influence and market capitalisation. Critiques levelled at the large accounting 
firms, and the strategies they have pursued to achieve their position of global 
domination, will be well known to readers of this journal (Carnegie and Napier, 2010; 
Hanlon, 1994; Malsch and Gendron, 2013; Smith-Lacroix et al., 2012). In this paper, 
we are particularly interested in exploring the symbolic processes that sustain their 
domination in the UK context. Adding to research that explores the underlying 
dynamics and relations of power in the professional accounting field (Brivot, 2011; 
Brown et al., 2010; Carter and Spence, 2013; Kornberger et al., 2010; Mueller et al., 
2011; Power, 2011; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004), this paper explores how this 
situation has emerged using the theoretical lens of Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990).  
The influence of Bourdieu’s system of thought has been profound across the 
social sciences (Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Maclean et al., 2012) 
and is increasingly being applied in accounting literature (Cooper and Coulson, 2013; 
Everett, 2004; Gracia and Oats, 2012; Malsch et al., 2011; Neu et al., 2008; Ramirez, 
2001). His theories are seen as particularly powerful for revealing taken-for-granted 
power relations and systems of domination that mask the status quo, thus yielding 
valuable insight for critical, moral and political inquiries (Cooper, 2002; Golsorkhi et 
al., 2009; Kerr and Robinson, 2012; Spence and Carter, 2013). As such, his lens has 
been used to view accounting regulation, technologies of governance, the accounting 
profession and to challenge accounting academia (Malsch et al., 2011).  
In this paper, we aim to document the social mechanisms of symbolic 
domination and reproduction within the field of professional accounting firms, and 
explore the role that the Big Four and other powerful agents play in underpinning the 
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social integration of an arbitrary order (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Symbolic 
productions aim to construct reality through monopolising “the power to impose 
instruments of knowledge and expression of social reality (taxonomies), which are 
arbitrary (but unrecognized as such)” (Bourdieu, 1977: 115). Symbolic power results 
from a web of institutional conditions and connections that empower dominant agents 
through an underlying belief in their legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1991: 167). The ‘rules of 
the game’ tend to be prescribed by dominant agents, whilst dominated agents 
misrecognise the arbitrariness of power dynamics or accept the rules as legitimate due 
to their inherent understanding of their own position and positions of possibility 
within the field (Bourdieu, 1977). This is achieved through symbolic violence, an 
invisible ‘magical’ mode of domination that Bourdieu uses to explain how doxa, or 
common sense, legitimises the production of an unequal distribution of capital 
through concealing power struggles and positional conflicts (Bourdieu, 1977; Everett, 
2002; Wacquant, 1987). Misrecognition is central to symbolic domination, and goes 
beyond social agents’ simply not being aware of objective reality, but instead means 
that they subjectively recognise practices within a shared cultural framework that 
conceals objective reality.  
We contribute to the growing body of accounting scholarship that uses 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework to unearth systems of domination (Cooper and 
Coulson, 2013; Golsorkhi et al., 2009). The theoretical contribution of this paper 
involves our documentation of the institutional and micro mechanisms of symbolic 
domination, and how, collectively, these mechanisms are able to support the Big 
Four’s domination in the UK accounting field. In approaching this issue, we explore 
three interrelated questions: How do social mechanisms of symbolic domination 
operate? What are the conditions of their effectiveness? And how are symbolic modes 
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of domination experienced by its victims? Empirically, our study evolves over a six-
year period, in which we collect data from key informants in small, mid-tier and Big 
Four firms in the UK, and draw on evidence presented to the House of Lords 
Committee on economic affairs regarding auditor concentration, to capture a range of 
perspectives of different agents regarding the social dynamics of the field.  
We identify a chain of mechanisms, both transformational and situational, that 
permit modes of symbolic domination. At a micro level, the Big Four and other 
agents deploy euphemised discourses of ‘four to zero’ that play on systemic fear of 
the repercussions of further consolidation, to colour perceptions and direct legislative 
changes in their interests. This leads to the institutionalisation of new regulatory and 
monitoring regimes, which place disabling constraints on smaller firms, and instil a 
sense of generalised fear and inadequacy that constitutes symbolic violence. Banks 
institutionalise processes of symbolic domination through their implicit privileging of 
the Big Four, and through objectifying mechanisms such as restrictive covenants and 
discriminatory lending practices that legitimate the symbolic capital of the Big Four. 
Professional institutes engage in symbolic productions through naming and 
recategorising smaller firms as ‘business advisors’, thereby inculcating classificatory 
schemes that affect the symbolic capital of firms, as well as habituating new forms of 
practices. The potential for recognition and resistance to domination that can emerge 
from actors and discourses at the core and periphery of the field (Guénin-Paracini and 
Gendron, 2010; Smith-Lacroix et al., 2012) is also discussed, providing a timely 
insight into the dynamics of power in the accounting field given contemporary 
debates regarding competition and choice, and the future role of large accounting 
firms in the UK.  
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The rest of the paper is structured in four main sections. First, we provide a 
concise overview of Bourdieu’s system of thought, the symbolic production of 
domination, and how these ideas can be used to frame insights into the structure of 
domination in the accounting field. Next, we present our research methods, which 
owing to the research problem and the demands of Bourdieu’s paradigm involved an 
evolving relational analysis, drawing on multiple data collection instruments, to 
explore embedded discourses in historical and institutional context. In the third 
section we present the findings of our analysis where we explore the mechanisms and 
context of domination, and how symbolic modes of domination are experienced by 
members of the field. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of 
our analysis, its limitations and our suggestions for future work.  
  
 
2. Bourdieusian praxeology: Symbolic productions and the structuring of 
domination 
2.1 Bourdieu’s system of thought 
The basic elements of the ‘Bourdieusian triad’ are the concepts of field 
(denoting the social structure), the various forms of capital (relating to power 
relations) and the habitus (the role of the individual) (Dobbin, 2008; Malsch et al., 
2011; Maclean et al., 2012). Social worlds are defined in terms of fields, each with 
their own stakes and interests, and which constitute a social topography of agents 
positioned in fields according to the overall volume and configuration of capital 
available to them (Anheier et al., 1995; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). A social field 
is a field of force through which the arbitrary is naturalised, and is located within the 
more general field of power, “a metafield of contestation for dominant agents”, 
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wherein we find various economic and cultural fields and their struggles for relative 
social status (Maclean et al., 2014: 2; 2010). Capital is broadly defined as comprising 
economic, cultural, social and symbolic forms, and different fields are characterised 
by a dominance of specific forms of capital and an ongoing struggle by agents, not 
only for capital, but to determine what the dominant form of capital is. Bourdieu 
(2005: 193) acknowledges that firms can also be thought of as agents, the dominant of 
which draw on forms of capital such as financial resources, technical resources and 
goodwill to “define the regularities and sometimes the rules of the game” (emphasis 
in original).  
The habitus operates as a linking mechanism, embedding the social structure 
unconsciously into the agent, resulting in a system of durable, transposable 
dispositions that generate and organise practices and representations (Bourdieu, 
1977). Here we find “that which does without saying, which requires no inculcating” 
which is termed doxa (Bourdieu and Waquant, 1992: 168). Illusio and doxa comprise 
the ensemble of tacit beliefs and unconscious practices that field members rely on, 
and relates to routines and actions that are done automatically (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). 
Illusio is a functioning of the field and indicates the willingness of agents to 
participate in the game, implying a tacit agreement that it is worth the effort to 
struggle over the field’s capital. As Bourdieu (1998: 77-78) writes, the illusio is “the 
enchanted relation to a game that is the product of a relation of ontological complicity 
between mental structures and the objective structures of social space”. Thus, what is 
commonsense to those invested in the field, appears as nonsensical, an illusion, to 
those outside it.	   	  
2.2 Symbolic modes of domination: symbolic power and symbolic violence 
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Bourdieu’s ‘relational logic’ centres on the arbitrary nature of social differences 
that are made meaningful only through the fact that a work of social construction 
exists to imbue these differences with meaning. “What is at stake in the struggles 
about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and 
systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their 
mobilization and demobilization” (Bourdieu, 1984: 481). Bourdieu was particularly 
interested in how fields operate in terms of symbolic power and the mechanisms 
through which systems of domination are reproduced unconsciously by agents 
through their practices (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi et al., 2009). 
Bourdieu (1987: 844) explains: 
The specific property of symbolic power is that it can be exercised only 
through the complicity of those who are dominated by it. This complicity 
is all the more certain because it is unconscious on the part of those who 
undergo its effects- or perhaps we should say it is more subtly extorted 
from them. […] the element of arbitrariness at the heart of its functioning 
(which may vary from case to case) remains unrecognized. 
 
Symbolic power might therefore be viewed as quasi-magical power that “makes it 
possible to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained by (physical or economic) force, 
thanks to its specific mobilization effect” (Bourdieu, 1979: 83). The root of symbolic 
power derives from the correspondence between social and mental structures that 
establish a shared sense of order (Alawattage, 2011; Bourdieu, 1979; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Carter and Spence, 2013).  
Symbolic violence specifically denotes “the imposition of such principles of 
division and more generally of any symbolic representations (languages, 
conceptualisations, portrayals), on recipients who have little choice about whether to 
accept or reject them” (Terdiman, 1987: 812). In other words, symbolic violence 
allows those with power to impose instruments of knowledge and expression 
(Bourdieu, 1979) and change the actions of other social agents, with their complicity, 
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and without the need for conscious or direct strategic action (Kerr and Robinson, 
2012; Oakes et al., 1998). The historically determinate conditions of the means of 
production of the habitus provides agents with a ‘sense of reality’, based on a dialectic 
of the perception of what is possible in terms of aspirations and what the objective 
chances of success are. This means the symbolically dominated conspire and commit 
isolated treasons against themselves; they are often complicit in their own domination 
and feel interior defeat due to their ‘disenchanted habitus’, which results from the 
sense that there are limited possibilities in the field (Bourdieu, 1990). Dominant 
agents seek to impose the legitimacy of their domination through symbolic 
productions, as if this were done overtly, dominated agents could recognise the self-
interested nature of the struggle and fight for their own interests.  
Particularly central to Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic modes of 
domination is the concept of méconnaissance, usually translated as ‘misrecognition’. 
Misrecognition is at the heart of practical logic and practical modes of perceiving and 
being in the social world that allow injustice and intolerable conditions to be 
perceived as acceptable and natural (Bourdieu, 2001). According to Bourdieu (1993: 
25), there is an ‘experiential’, apparent, subjective sense of necessity, that may be 
quite unrelated to the objective necessity that is implied by reality itself. By necessity, 
Bourdieu is referring to knowledge of the laws of the social world that when 
misrecognised are considered as natural. Misrecognition of necessity is thus seen as 
the most powerful and total recognition of social laws because they are unconscious, 
whereas “knowledge of necessity does not at all imply the necessity of that 
recognition” (Bourdieu, 1993: 25). In order to avoid being overly deterministic, 
Bourdieu (2000) concedes that misfirings between habitus and the field may lead to 
new adaptations, and that agents’ misrecognition will depend on their differing 
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degrees of autonomy and dispositional variations. Resistance is, however, highly 
problematic because symbolic domination is absorbed like air and represents an 
invisible pressure to which individuals are perfectly adapted.   
 
2.3 Theoretical and empirical development of Bourdieu’s work 
Rather than attempt to summarise the body of accounting scholarship that has 
used Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (see Malsch et al., 2011, for an overview of 
the influence of Bourdieu in the accounting literature), we will draw attention to some 
of the work that has explicitly explored the notions of domination, symbolic power 
and symbolic violence. In regulatory terms, Bourdieu’s system of thought has been 
used to shed light on the social processes used to construct, defend and maintain 
boundaries in tax regulation (Gracia and Oats, 2012) and to explore field-level 
struggles for domination and power in the development of regulatory processes and 
outcomes (Xu and Xu, 2008). Both of these studies shed light on how relational 
interactions drive field-level change, highlighting the role of the state and ‘collusio’ 
between powerful agents and institutions. The literature has also explored how 
Bourdieu’s praxeology can shed light on processes of domination sustained through 
accounting technologies, for instance, how practices diffuse across countries and why 
they vary (Neu et al., 2008), or how institutional lending practices contribute to the 
spread of financial and accounting practices (Neu and Ocampo, 2007).  
Elsewhere, symbolic power and symbolic violence have been specifically 
explored in Cooper’s (2002) investigation of human rights, Hamilton and Ó 
hÓgartaigh’s (2009) account of how auditors dominate the construction of the 
meaning of the true and fair view, Alawattage’s (2011) examination of the symbolic 
system of rituals in gem mining, and Everett’s (2003) examination of the role of 
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symbolic violence in securing a monopoly over received wisdom on the problem of 
effectiveness audits. Outside of accounting, symbolic violence has been linked to 
business planning, whereby language and the processes of naming, categorising and 
regularising allowed dominant agents to replace one set of meanings with another 
(Oakes et al., 1998), and more recently to the globalising of the Scottish banking elite 
(Robinson and Kerr, 2012). Whilst much research tends to focus on the importance of 
language in symbolic violence, the present research shares the underlying sentiments 
of Hamilton and Ó hÓgartaigh (2009) that symbolic violence is evident in ‘collective 
beliefs’ and the rites and rituals of the profession, which go beyond language and 
shared meaning (Bourdieu, 1991; Hamilton and Ó hÓgartaigh, 2009). 
Bourdieu was fiercely critical of the concept of ‘profession’, understanding it to 
be “a prefabricated concept which Anglo-Saxon sociological tradition borrowed 
directly from its historical doxa” (Bourdieu, 1995: xii). Bourdieusian sociology calls 
into question the use of such organizational categories, which place a neutralising veil 
over the space of competition and struggle that underpins the term (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu’s approach does, however, add much to a critical 
understanding of the sociology of the professions, including a focus on the historical 
genesis of power-driven fields, recognition of the dynamic nature and vulnerability of 
the professional fields, and acknowledgement of habitus/field combinations and 
associated forms of dominance, submission and logics of hierarchisation (Dezalay and 
Sugarman, 1995; Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). In the accounting literature, 
research has explored struggles by professionals to achieve control over the 
production of professionals and the performance of their activity (Ramirez, 2001), and 
how the auditing profession act politically to establish control over meaning and 
resources (Everett, 2003). Bourdieusian sociology has deployed by Malsch and 
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Gendron (2013) to re-theorise institutional change in their examination of the struggle 
for domination in the field of public accounting. More recently, Carter and Spence 
(2013) have used Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to explore what it means to be a 
successful professional in the Big Four today.  
Despite progress being made in this area, Malsch and Gendron (2013) call for 
more field studies that examine the relationships between micro-practices and the 
broader structure or context to further flesh out the role of the habitus in processes of 
change and reproduction. In further drawing out the social mechanisms of symbolic 
domination, we contribute to this research agenda, and further understanding of the 
roles played by habitus and illusio as a logic or code for the social behaviour of a field 
(Macintosh and Free, 2008). We also respond to calls for understanding how 
domination is reproduced and challenged with the accounting field (Malsch et al., 
2011) by focusing specifically on the organizational context of professional services 
performed by accounting firms in the UK (Suddaby et al., 2009). We now move on to 
describe the research approach used to capture empirical insights into this 
phenomenon, in which we rely on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework to inform both 
the style of our data collection and the analytical techniques employed.   
 
3. Research methods 
In terms of approach, we were mindful of Bourdieu’s advice for methodological 
polytheism, in line with his view of research as a construction and the product of 
considerable abstraction (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 30).  Similarly, a 
Bourdieusian approach necessitates a relational analysis, where agents are viewed as 
integrated into a world of relations rather than as individuals (Everett, 2002). Our 
research needed to accommodate both the ‘emic’ view, where thoughts and actions 
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are described primarily in terms of the actors’ self-understanding, and the ‘etic’ 
perspective, which situates data within broader discursive frameworks and theoretical 
debates (Bickman and Rog, 1998; Morris et al., 1999). As such, we draw on multiple 
sources of empirical data in order to capture the dynamics of multi-faceted relations in 
the field, and in a cyclic process moved between theorising and conducting empirical 
research (Wallace, 1971).  
The empirical research object addressed in this study are the contextually 
grounded social mechanisms of symbolic power and symbolic violence that sustain 
the domination of the Big Four over other accounting firms in the UK field. Our 
initial route towards this research object was to interview socially variable entities, 
occupying different positions in social space. Both dominant and dominated agents, 
according to Bourdieu, exist in a state of ‘learned ignorance’, meaning that their 
symbolic reality is shaped and structured by the systems of domination (Everett, 
2002). This raises the problematic issue that such agents are unlikely to be able to 
articulate the mechanisms of domination and symbolic violence themselves, and the 
researcher must seek to unmask these taken-for-granted power relations. These factors 
become inscribed in the habitus or dispositions of agents, but might be teased out by 
the researcher who probes their sense or feel for the social game, their practices and 
actions, and the perceptions that pervade their social behaviour, both collectively and 
individually (Bourdieu, 1990). In identifying the strategies and dispositions of 
dominated agents, and teasing out their use of “postulates and axioms… or binary 
oppositions, labels and categories” (Everett, 2002: 66), the researcher can identify 
how domination, cognition and communication operate through reconciling these 
subject-orientated elements with the relational dynamics of power identified in the 
field.  
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We thus felt it was important to gather data pertaining to patterns and action 
dispositions amongst dominant and dominant agents in the field, and how the habitus 
reveals incongruities that are related to the social field in which agents are embedded 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). Our data collection process evolved relative to our 
emergent findings and understanding, rather than being pre-determined (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). We began by interviewing owning partners in small practices to 
understand how they perceived other agents in the field, the historical trajectory of the 
field, and their own place within it. This stage of data collection allowed us to 
generate preliminary ideas as to the social mechanisms and conditions of domination, 
and was particularly useful in answering our third research question which concerned 
how symbolic modes of domination were experienced by its victims. As our 
understanding of the dispositions of small practice and the micromechanisms of 
symbolic domination developed, we began to interview mid-Tier and Big Four firms, 
and a regulator, to gain a comparative understanding of informants at different 
hierarchical levels within the field. Our initial primary research in the period 2006-
2008 constituted 30 interviews, at which stage we considered that we had reached 
theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Our interviews with key informants aimed to tease out their dispositions, 
categories of perception and to appreciate their ‘lived experience’ (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). The interviews were semi-structured and the interviewers referred to a 
list of themes relevant to our research questions to enhance comparability and to 
ensure topics were covered. Within the parameters of our themes, modest adaptations 
were made according to the professional context of the informant. Our directiveness 
was restricted to probing incomplete information, clarifying ambiguities and 
encouraging elaboration. We followed all relevant guidelines to ensure the 
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trustworthiness of the study (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), including informing the 
participants how the data would be used, guaranteeing their anonymity and offering 
them the chance to review the transcripts. All interviews lasted between one and two 
hours, and were conducted at the informants’ place of work. 
Our data collection was informed by a narrative approach, which aims to draw 
out the symbolic in social life and meaning in individual lives (Bertaux and Kohli, 
1984). We asked participants retrospectively to relate the narrative of their 
professional lives enabling us to capture longitudinal data, albeit of a reflective as 
opposed to de facto nature. As well as illuminating links between subjectivity and 
social structures, narrative approaches are also an effective tool for gathering 
exploratory data on complex processes and how relations change and evolve over 
time (Becker, 1970). The habitus itself has also been viewed as comprising 
‘narratives’ (Drummond, 1998): narratives around the imposition and resistance of 
habitus (conflict); and the destruction and replacement of habitus (change). 
At the end of the interview stage, we had developed a range of codes and 
categories relative to our research questions, but our understanding was primarily 
respondent-centred. An opportunity arose in the research process to examine evidence 
submitted by a large number of field agents in a government-led inquiry examining 
the dominance of the Big Four. As such, it represents an explicit challenge by 
multiple members of the field to the Big Four accounting firms, and presents an 
opportunity to gain multiple perspectives on the operations and conditions of the 
symbolic system of domination, and its victims, in the UK accounting field. Our main 
source of data collection was the Report and Evidence submitted to the 2010-2011 
House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs inquiry: ‘Auditors: market 
concentration and their role’. The documents contain oral and written evidence 
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collected from representatives of the following: accounting academia; professional 
associations; professional oversight and regulatory bodies; mid-tier firms; financial 
regulatory bodies; the Big Four; representatives for large corporations; politicians; 
and rating agencies. A full list of participants in the inquiry is publicly available.  
We analysed these documents, identifying discourses and representations put 
forward by various field members, comparing our findings with the first phase of data 
collection, and noting where, in particular, field-level assumptions were made explicit 
and challenged. This was useful source of data, collected independently of our study 
but through which we could crosscheck and further illuminate our understanding of 
the mechanisms and the conditions of effectiveness of symbolic domination across a 
wide and varied selection of field agents.  
The data analysis phase included the researchers’ independently coding both the 
interview and House of Lords data and then meeting to discuss and find consensus on 
the emerging codes and themes. Themes that bore relevance to the three research 
questions were drawn out using the constant comparative method, both within and 
across interviews, and using the House of Lords evidence (Glaser, 1965). Data 
analysis was ongoing and iterative, employing a cycle of comparison and reflection 
on old and new data, within and across stages and cases to inform emerging themes 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Additionally, the emerging themes were compared with 
findings from the literature and theoretical perspectives (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 
2000) to arrive at the final list of codes and categories. Where relevant we included 
secondary data, such as published reports and news articles, in the presentation of the 
findings to provide a thick description and contextualisation of the analysis.   
 
4. Findings 
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4.1. Setting the scene: Professional accounting firms in the UK 
This study is based on the UK field of professional services performed by 
accounting firms, and we note that the national context can be an important factor in 
determining the dynamics of the field. In France, for example, legislation mandating 
joint auditors was introduced to protect small and medium-sized firms, and the Big 
Four have a significantly smaller market share as a result. In the UK, the Big Four are 
clearly dominant agents, evidenced by their increasing market capitalisation and fee 
income. By the end of 2008, the Big Four firms conducted the audits of 99 of the 
FTSE100 companies, and 99% of the FTSE350 companies (FRC, 2011; Oxera, 2006; 
Jettuah, 2008). Dominated agents in the analysis are primarily viewed as smaller 
accounting practices engaged in public practice. The growing structural dominance of 
the Big Four over other firms in the field can also be demonstrated by their growing 
market share and fee income captured, featured in Tables 1 and 2 below: 
 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
 
We conducted the interviews between 2006 and 2008 at which time, in 
response to corporate scandals and a lack of confidence in the auditing profession, a 
wave of new regulations and legislative changes were coming into effect. After the 
exit of Andersen, concentration ratios in the large client markets increased to 
enormous levels (Beattie et al., 2003; Oxera, 2006) and in the UK, the supply of mid-
tier firms fell, largely as a result of mergers and firms leaving the market, voluntarily 
or otherwise. The Big Four have a history of influencing policy, regulatory and 
professional bodies through their collective lobbying and other legitimation activities 
(Malsh and Gendron, 2013; Puxty et al., 1987; Robson et al., 1994; Sikka and 
Wilmott, 2009). In the following analysis we first present our findings regarding 
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research questions one and two, which reveal three social mechanisms associated with 
the dominance of the Big Four, namely rites of institution, euphemised discourse and 
socialisation. We conceptualise these mechanisms relative to Bourdieusian theory and 
discuss both how they operate and what the associated conditions of their 
effectiveness are. We have selected prominent empirical illustrations of each 
mechanism and highlight in the analysis how the mechanisms relate to and reinforce 
one another. Following on from this we present our analysis of research question 
three, identifying how symbolic modes of domination were experienced by its’ 
victims. We present our understanding of how socially inculcated classificatory 
schemes affect the symbolic capital of accounting firms, and demonstrate how these 
institutional and micro mechanisms contribute to the cyclical reproduction of 
domination.  
 
4.2. Rites of institution and implicit privileging 
One way in which symbolic power was exercised and reproduced in the UK 
accounting field was through ‘rites of institution’ (Bourdieu, 1982). All rites 
consecrate or legitimate arbitrary boundaries, and naturalise the social acts which 
construct the categories upon which the rites are based (Bourdieu, 1991). In other 
words, rites of institution assign, for instance, values or competences to individuals, 
and these serve as signifiers with symbolic power that transform individuals in terms 
of how they are perceived and how they perceive themselves. Rites of institution can 
thus benignly mask dominant power hierarchies. The policies and practices of UK 
banks in this period exercised this form of symbolic power, both reflecting the 
structural conditions of the field in terms of the Big Four’s dominance, and 
contributing to the field’s constitution through allowing the Big Four’s dominance to 
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grow, in both economic and symbolic terms. The implicit privileging of the large 
accounting firms by the banks does not require direct intervention by the Big Four, as 
the doxa that ‘big is best’ is inherent in the modes of interaction and balance of power 
associated with the ‘financialisation’ of global business (Gleadle, 2014; 
Stockhammer, 2004). Whilst beyond the remit of this research, there is ample 
literature charting the dominant discourses in the globalised business world (Fine, 
2004; DiMaggio, 2003; Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2004), which impact on the micro-
level practices of banks and have implications for the continued growth and 
dominance of the Big Four.  
From the perspective of small practices, it was well recognised that should one 
of their clients grow and require access to finance, banks would insist that the client 
switched to a large accounting firm, a policy that would often result in the loss of the 
most lucrative clients. One partner commented:  
Within certain ranges I don’t think it makes a difference but if you’re 
going to the bank for ten million [pounds] then yes, you need a bigger 
name … They just feel that the larger organisation is potentially more 
competent. They’ve also got bigger PI cover so that might be something 
they take into account as well. (Partner, Small Accounting Partnership) 
 
It was thus generally accepted that banks had a perception that ‘big is good’, and 
would insist on ‘bigger sized firms who can offer a bigger package’. Banks are 
powerful institutional possessors of capital, able to consecrate boundaries and 
articulate the established order through drawing lines, for example, between who is 
creditworthy and who is not. Banks and their policies also have symbolic efficacy, 
influencing the representations others have towards the Big Four, increasing the Big 
Four’s self-belief, and making smaller firms aware of their inferiority. Inequities in 
the banking system are usually misrecognised as arbitrary, and we found that smaller 
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firms often acted in complicity by suggesting their clients might be better off 
switching to a Big Four firm before approaching the bank to raise finance. 
Further discrimination was evident in the lending practices of banks, which 
would refuse very minor loans to small start-up accounting practices, but would offer 
‘blank cheques’ to established accounting firms. In an established mid-tier firm, 
accessing funds was not an issue, as one partner remarked: 
One of the bank managers I’ve met has said, because you’re an accountant 
they would give you anything. Give you a six-figure sum without even 
looking at your figures… just because you’re an accountancy firm and an 
established one. (Partner, Mid-tier Accounting Partnership) 
 
Banks are powerful agents that span multiple fields, yet the Big Four also span 
multiple fields across international boundaries and, significantly, audit the banks as 
well as most of their major clients. When viewed in the context of the involvement of 
the banks in structural changes, such as the increasing globalisation of financial flows, 
it becomes apparent why the habitus dispositions of the banks were easily reconciled 
with the Big Four and why, at a micro-level, their practices increasingly privileged 
their custom. The banks support the symbolic system of the accounting field by 
institutionally supporting the view that the Big Four firms are more competent, which 
reinforces the system of distinction and ‘self-evident’ differences in quality across UK 
accounting firms. As such, the banks act as instruments of domination, implicitly 
privileging the Big Four and securing them symbolic power, whilst exerting symbolic 
violence on smaller accounting practices, who are systematically denied recognition 
and who recognise the acts of banks as natural and legitimate.  
The role of the banks was also picked up on by the House of Lords inquiry 
where it was observed that the banks’ policies had hardened into restrictive covenants, 
wherein: “Banks or organisations themselves are stipulating upfront that they will 
only employ a Big Four firm” (Ms Brand, ACCA, Auditor Concentration: Report, 
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2011: 10). Mr Richards of Aviva Investors noted the effect of a more ‘diffuse 
snobbery’ where a ‘patina of authority and confidence’ surrounded the Big Four:    
Analysts and investment bankers are often concerned that the presence of 
a mid-tier firm as auditor will negatively impact a company’s 
marketability, either by creating the perception that the company was shed 
by a big four because of high risk, or raising a spectre of doubt about the 
validity of its financial statements. (Auditor Concentration: Evidence, 
2011: 315) 
 
Mid-tier firms saw this institutional prejudice as the biggest barrier to their entry into 
the market, as it’s a ‘safer bet’ to buy the Big Four (Mr Michaels, BDO, Auditor 
Concentration: Evidence, 2011: 133). The direct challenges made to the implicit 
privileging of the banks is due to the fact that when you replace symbolic modes of 
domination with objective mechanisms, such as restrictive covenants, it becomes 
more likely that they will be noticed, and thus require the return to subtler forms of 
symbolic domination. 
 
4.3. Four to zero: Illusio and the role of euphemised discourse  
The circumstances and debates regarding Enron and the ensuing regulatory 
changes are well versed in this journal (see Craig and Amernic, 2004; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2004). Our analysis draws further attention to how the Big Four firms used 
the structural conditions created by the demise of Andersen and the financial markets’ 
fear of further consolidation as a foundation from which to support their interests with 
regard to regulatory, field-level change in the UK. A powerful way the Big Four firms 
engaged, collectively, in actions of representation was by throwing into relief a 
particular envisioned reality that the market could go from ‘four to zero’. In 
particular, the changing nature of the globalised economy and the increasing size and 
complexity of client engagements were identified as threats due to the associated rise 
and scope of litigation. ‘Four to zero’ operated as a situational device that implied, to 
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a receptive field, that the threat of further consolidation existed, and that unless 
changes to liability were introduced, further firm exits would be inevitable. ‘Four to 
zero’ can therefore be seen as a mechanism of symbolic power that further legitimated 
the continued domination of the Big Four.  
Our interviews with partners in Big Four firms revealed how the potential threat 
of further firm exit was deployed in discourse in order to support a particular 
programme of regulatory change, and to legitimate changes to be made to the joint 
and several liability regulations. A Big Four partner argued that a ‘four to three’ 
scenario was increasingly possible: “If [they] don’t grant us liability reform, it’s just a 
matter of time before one of us winds up” (Partner, Big Four Firm). It has also been 
noted that the Big Four invested considerable resources at this time in directly 
lobbying for changes to legal liability legislation (Cousins et al., 2004). A regulator 
opined that the threat of ‘four to zero’ was very real, given that if another firm exited 
the market, the others would soon follow: 
…if another big firm falls over, there would most likely be one of two 
causes, either it will be some incorporate legality action by some regulator 
somewhere, or it will be a result of some catastrophic litigation. The other 
three that are left standing may well conclude at this point that frankly it’s 
just a matter of time before this happens to us. The risk to the audit 
business is no longer acceptable and that we would rather exit the audit 
market at a time and a manner of our own choosing than waiting for some 
regulator or some judge to destroy us. (Regulator, Anonymous) 
 
The above statement demonstrates that regulators were complicit in establishing what 
Bourdieu (2005) termed the ‘gnoseological order’, which generates consensus about 
the immediate meaning of the social world. The threat of further firm exit 
consequently served as source for social consensus when it came to regulatory 
changes that were geared fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order, which 
we discuss in more detail below.  
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Whilst ‘four to zero’ may appear to overestimate rather than euphemise the 
threat of consolidation in the field, beyond the use of euphemism as a linguistic 
device, a broader phenomenon of euphemisation can be identified. Euphemisation is 
defined by Bourdieu (1977: 196) as an “elementary form of the labor of 
objectification which eventually leads to the juridical definition of acceptable 
behaviour”. In other words, euphemisation disguises the true nature of relations of 
domination through appearing to be a practical rule or code of honour that governs 
what is deemed acceptable behaviour, and which weighs on all agents. 
Conceptualised in this way, euphemisation is a discursive strategy that frames and 
legitimates through the language of evasion, hypocrisy, prudery and deceit (Holder, 
2007). ‘Four to zero’ was thus a euphemised threat of exit, through which the Big 
Four were able to rally field members’ to collectively sanction regulatory changes that 
made them complicit in their own domination.  
Bourdieu (1993) writes that every expression is an accommodation between an 
expressive interest (a political interest) and a censorship constituted by the structure 
of capital and the social conditions of the constitution of the group. The threat of ‘four 
to zero’ that is implied in the discourses of the Big Four and other field agents who 
believe the threat exists, is a powerful suggestion. Bourdieu believes this type of 
suggestion “… is the condition for the effectiveness of all kinds of symbolic power 
that will subsequently be able to operate on a habitus predisposed to respond to them” 
(1991: 52). In terms of the conditions for the effectiveness of ‘four to zero’, all 
euphemisms are specific to a field in time, which has its particular constraints and 
forms of censorship that are recognised by those who inhabit it. After Andersen’s exit, 
the field collectively feared further volatility and consolidation, and these conditions 
made the threat of further exit particularly poignant. Instead of drawing attention to 
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why one of the big firms failed, ‘four to zero’ underlined the collective belief in the 
centrality of the Big Four to the stability of the professional accounting field and the 
financial markets. The threat of ‘four to zero’ was thus misrecognised in that it was 
not interpreted as a strategy deployed by the Big Four to push for legislative reforms. 
Rhetorical strategies have also been used by the large accounting firms in previous 
efforts to legitimate institutional change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).  
Outsiders to the field might legitimately question why these large firms should 
consider themselves to be worthy of protection from further consolidation. Bourdieu’s 
theoretical framework points to a number of reasons why this threat was effective. 
The Big Four as dominant agents must maintain the illusio of the professional field, 
the rules of the game (Malsch and Gendron, 2013), and particularly the importance of 
their role in auditing listed companies. Field members’ habitus nurtures the illusio of 
audit practices as meaningful and appropriate, because in professional terms, the role 
of audit operates as doxa: a pre-reflexive, taken-for-granted assumption that is 
implied in membership of the field itself. Whilst dominant agents could still be 
challenged, the Big Four have a long history of being associated with audit practice, 
and with auditing all of the large listed companies in the UK, from which they have 
generated significant symbolic capital and perceived legitimacy. Outside of the direct 
field, macro-level institutions such as the ‘self-regulating market’ and state-level 
support for audit practice also reproduce conditions for the differential allocation of 
capital and the recognition of the Big Four’s power as legitimate. The power of ‘four 
to zero’ is in facilitating a climate of fear at a time of turbulence and volatility, aided 
by the belief that the Big Four are central to maintaining trust and confidence in the 
financial system. 
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In the House of Lords inquiry, the question of ‘four to zero’ was brought into 
focus, with the Big Four’s claims about the catastrophic unfairness of unlimited 
liability described as ‘misleading’ by the Law Commission, “notable more for its 
audacity than its accuracy as a description of either the theory of joint and several 
liability or its likely effect” (Iain Richards: Audit Concentration: Evidence, 2011: 
317). The Big Four continued to argue in their defence that LLP protection and 
insurance was essential as litigation was “the single most likely cause of there only 
being three of us in front of you at another time” (Mr Griffith-Jones, KPMG, Auditor 
Concentration: Evidence: 2011: 231). The question of ‘four to zero’ was raised by 
Lord Tugendhat, who stated: “We are not comfortable with a position where large 
firms could determine the shape of regulation by threatening to withdraw from the 
audit market” (Auditor Concentration: Evidence, 2011: 217). The euphemised 
discourse of ‘four to zero’, as deployed by the Big Four, was contested and 
repositioned as a threat that could jeopardise the independence of regulators, rather 
than threaten the confidence of capital markets and investors. Mr Jubb, of Standard 
Life Investments (2011: 300) commented: 
…  there are issues as to the attitude of regulators and others in terms of 
taking action which could bring down one of the Big 4, or indeed one of 
the Big 6 even, in a manner that would precipitate the consequences that 
judgement suggests is not going to be healthy for the capital markets and 
could undermine confidence in them. 
 
Similarly the FRC pointed towards a potential for ‘moral hazard’ as the largest firms 
“consider they are ‘too big to fail’ and judge that governments and regulators will be 
reluctant to take enforcement action against them if that action had the potential to 
result in the firm leaving the market” (FRC, Auditor Concentration, 2011: 157), a 
viewpoint confirmed by the ACCA’s evidence.  
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At a more structural level, the taken for granted, commonsense understanding 
that capital markets rely on the Big Four and audit for their functioning has been 
increasingly questioned in recent years (Malsch and Gendron, 2009; Sikka, 2009). 
The current re-evaluation of the threat of ‘four to zero’ in the House of Lords inquiry 
demonstrates that the euphemised discourse of dominant actors can be challenged 
under certain conditions. In this case, the fall-out from the 2008 financial crisis has 
led to the illusio being challenged, whereby field agents and those operating in the 
field of power have started to reassess the legitimacy of regulatory measures and the 
domination of the Big Four in large firm audit. Whilst the doxa concerning the role of 
audit remains largely intact, a new ‘sense of the game’ might be emerging, based on 
the sustainability of the audit market through a new set of imperatives, such as 
developing contingency measures, reforming the audit function and introducing 
government intervention to stimulate competition.  
 
4.4. Professional socialisation and classification 
Another form of symbolic power levied against smaller practices operated 
through the professional institutes. Previous research has pointed out the powerful 
position the Big Four occupy in terms of the social structure of the field of 
accounting, for instance, through their appointment to controlling positions in the 
professional institutes (Ramirez, 2009). It may be the case that the institutes are 
themselves the victims of domination (Suddaby et al., 2007), and are now little more 
than “iconic watchdogs” (Malsch and Gendron, 2013: 887). However, professional 
institutes still play a powerful role in legitimating systems of classification that 
impose an apprehension of the established order as natural (Bourdieu, 2005; Ramirez, 
2013). They have symbolic power through being able to impose a de jure definition of 
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acceptable behaviour and a code of honour for their members, permeating their 
mental structures and practices. As such they are in a powerful position to legitimate 
and naturalise social acts to their members through processes of professional 
socialisation.  
Professional institutes have been involved with institutionalising the identity of 
small practitioners as general business advisors, a finding that has been reported in 
previous research (Ramirez, 2009). Our data shed light on the extent to which this had 
been internalised by field members by revealing the transformed habitus and micro-
modification of the practices of small and medium-sized firms. The following 
comments made by partners in small and medium-sized accounting firms were 
particularly illustrative of the powerful effects the recategorisation was having:  
I think we’re business advisors at the end of the day. Compliance is a 
given. It just happens in the background. The rest is about how to improve 
the way you do it, look at what the best people do and take that 
information… verbalise it, and have a chat about it. (Partner, Small 
Accounting Partnership) 
 
You don’t make money from compliance. That’s bread and butter to us. 
It’s the add-on services. We can help you sell a business, buy a business, 
give you expert tax planning… (Partner, Mid-tier Accounting Partnership) 
 
The effectiveness of the professional institutes’ support for the reclassification of 
smaller practices as ‘business advisors’ was reinforced by the modification of capital 
distribution in the field, which had led to diminishing returns on compliance work. It 
was also affected by macro-level legislative changes, such as the raising of the audit 
threshold, which had changed the nature of the competitive landscape for small firms 
by increasing the entrance of ‘non-qualifieds’ into the market. By removing the audit 
requirement for most small firms, compliance work was increasingly undertaken by 
accountants who were not registered with a professional institute, which is precisely 
why they were able to undercut smaller firms who are.  
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We did find pockets of resistance to the reclassification of small practitioners as 
‘business advisors’, demonstrating the capacity of the habitus to resist by maintaining 
the conditions of its creation. For professionals this is inscribed and embodied from, 
amongst other things, their education and subsequent experiences of practice. 
Bourdieu’s (1989) theorisation of the social space is not static or singular: properties 
are subject to variations in time so that their meaning is indeterminate, and there can 
be a plurality of visions that form the base for symbolic struggles. Thus, for some of 
our informants, the perceptions remained that their expertise was solely in the ‘bread 
and butter’ of accounts and tax work. These accountants maintained their professional 
work was very much a routine: “You have to get a set of accounts done every year. 
You have to get a tax return done every year, and that’s what we do… Somebody 
coming and saying how can I pay absolutely no tax. That’s a different taxi” (Partner, 
Small Accounting Partnership). As with the refusal to give up audit, some smaller 
practices were preserving their habitus through resistance to the classification 
attempts of the professional institutes and despite adverse structural changes in the 
field. However, it is worthwhile noting that for many of these practitioners, the 
orthodox vision of the small firm was one with less technical expertise, and ‘little in 
common with high fliers’ who are naturally classified as the large firms occupying 
dominant positions in the social hierarchy.   
From a Bourdieusian perspective, agents engage in struggles to impose the 
legitimate principle of vision and division, and are endlessly occupied in the 
negotiation of their own identity (Bourdieu, 1989). Dominant agents are powerful 
because they are able to “to transform reality by shaping the mental schemes and 
meanings that guide the behaviour of those who make it up in their daily practical 
activities” (Waquant, 1987: 68). The attempt by the professional institutes to classify 
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small firms as ‘malpractitioners’ (Ramirez, 2009) and to recategorise them as general 
business advisors was reflected in the schemes of perception and practices of many of 
the small firms in our study, although there was evidence that different principles of 
vision and division persist within the professional habitus (Bourdieu, 1989). For 
Bourdieu, the production and circulation of group names and classificatory schemata 
reflects the movement of power. Acting as the representative voice of its members, 
professional institutes participate in legitimising and ensuring the misrecognition of 
its members to processes of naming that diminish the ‘professional’ identity of 
smaller practices by classifying them as business advisors. The Big Four already 
dominate in audit, tax and insolvency (considered to be the specialist knowledge areas 
of accounting work), and the actions of the professional institutes serve to further 
secure the Big Four’s ascendancy and symbolic power over the field.   
 
4.5. Domestication of the dominated? Victimisation, mimetic representation and 
forms of recognition and resistance 
Our data suggests the system of domination is circular and insidious: it is in the 
air, both explicit and implicit, everywhere and nowhere. These mechanisms both 
depend on and reproduce structural conditions of domination, but ultimately their 
success depends on the collaboration of those who are dominated. Having outlined 
three mechanisms that have helped to normalise the system of symbolic domination in 
the field, we now reflect in more detail on their effects, and the reaction of the 
dominated smaller agents to these symbolic processes and associated institutionalised 
constraints. We found that the exercise of symbolic violence in the field led to smaller 
firms internalising a sense of victimisation, evaluating themselves against the 
practices of the Big Four, and emulating their practices in processes of mimetic 
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isomorphism. We also found evidence that smaller firms sometimes recognise 
domination, and we conclude by reflecting on this recognition in relation to 
Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power and symbolic violence.   
In the period following Enron, a range of disabling constraints were 
institutionalised by the government and the profession, orientated around the 
“verification of actual compliance with standards essentially designed by and for 
larger firms” (Ramirez, 2009: 400). The effects of these constraints was that 
practitioners, particularly in small firms, were subjected to symbolic violence through 
stereotyping, increased scrutiny and being singled out for criticism by audit inspection 
committees and other oversight bodies. This was eventually internalised by small 
firms, who would blame themselves: 
You always get picked up on things as a small firm because you’re not 
necessarily doing these things as well as a large firm would. I carry a lot 
of information around in my head and I’m maybe not as good as bigger 
firms at putting it in the files. (Partner, Small Accounting Partnership) 
 
Similarly, when investigated by offices such as the HM Revenue and Customs and the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel, there was a sense that small practices would be 
picked on “because you’re deemed to be a relatively easy target or a suspect target” 
(Partner, Small Accounting Practice).  
The threshold for firms requiring an audit had also increased from zero to £5.6 
million by 2004, which virtually wiped out the market for small firm audits and 
which, combined with waves of other regulation and legislation, had caused some 
smaller firms to exit the market or merge with other firms. One partner discussed why 
these events eventually persuaded him to merge his small practice: 
The Inland Revenue started to get more aggressive and difficult and we 
had all sorts of other changes and impending changes. Money laundering 
regulations were on the horizon and I just began to feel as a small firm we 
were not going to be able to continue to make enough money, provide the 
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service we wanted to, or keep ourselves up to date. (Partner, Mid-tier 
Accounting Partnership) 
 
For small and medium-sized firms, the weight of legislation, including the adoption of 
IFRS, was ‘practically impossible to keep up with’, and regulation became so ‘mind-
blowing’ a lot of work they previously used to do for their clients was no longer 
economically feasible. One partner in a small practice commented that  “central 
government would like to legislate us out of business, regulate us out of business, 
because they would rather deal with four large firms than four thousand small ones”.  
To be policed and monitored is a form of control, and it is representative of 
modes of symbolic violence wherein certain groups become stigmatised or devalued, 
and internalise a sense of generalised fear and inadequacy. Moving beyond the 
symbolic, the structural mechanisms of domination created by the regulatory 
environment served to produce the “disenchanted dispositions their development 
demanded” (Bourdieu, 1977: 196). The most common reaction was for smaller 
practices to adapt to the new structural conditions of the field, for example, by exiting 
the audit market or changing the structure of their firm. Others chose to retain their 
audit, because “if you don’t have that competency, if it’s lost, it’s lost forever” 
(Partner, Small Accounting Partnership). Some smaller practices were struggling to 
hold on to this skill believing it was in their self-interest to do so, whereas evidence 
suggests auditing listed companies has become a near-monopoly practice for the Big 
Four, with mid-tier firms holding a foot in the door in the market for auditing smaller 
firms. This demonstrates, however, that the structural conditions of the field and the 
(modifiable) habitus positions can frame the possibilities of actions of agents (Malsch 
and Gendron, 2013).  
The habitus is an appreciation and action that result from the institution of the 
social in the body (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), and we found socialisation often 
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emerged from the practices of the Big Four themselves. The Big Four dominate the 
UK market for the recruitment of trainees and qualified accountants, and many of our 
respondents working in smaller practices had at one time worked for them as well. A 
partner in a small practice commented that:  
What I did at Price Waterhouse was auditing and when I moved back 
down the profession I realised we weren’t really auditing. We were 
preparing the accounts but the audit was just rubber-stamping really. 
(Partner, Small Accounting Partnership).  
 
It was not recognised that different forms of practices emerged from inherent resource 
constraints related to the capital available to smaller firms, and thus informants would 
often reflect negatively on their ability to perform practices such as audits in the same 
way that the Big Four do. Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975: 8) note that “… symbolic 
domination really begins when misrecognition implied by recognition leads those 
who are dominated to apply the dominant criteria of evaluation to their own 
practices”. The dominant criterion of evaluation in the UK accounting field is defined 
by the Big Four, and in trying to achieve these standards, smaller practices define as 
legitimate their own limitations, which derive from and reinforce power differences in 
the field (Hanks, 2005). By valorising the practices of large firms, smaller firms 
themselves generate symbolic power for the dominant firms and legitimate their own 
domination, which Bourdieu, taking from Weber’s phrase, said leads to the 
“domestication of the dominated” (Bourdieu, 1979: 80). 
The Big Four were seen by ex-employees as a ‘nightmare’ to work for in terms 
of working hours, salary and conditions:  
You were on a salary and that was it, the task was expected to be done 
within an unrealistic budget and the only people that benefit from that are 
the partners. […] they bully people into doing things. I can’t understand 
why I did it with hindsight but nonetheless that’s what we did, everybody 
did it. You were just part of that tidal wave of doing things. (Partner, 
Small Accounting Partnership)  
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Working conditions themselves can constitute a form of symbolic violence (Everett, 
2002) where there is a general acceptance and complicity of the accounting workforce 
in the ‘merit’ of working excessively long hours. ‘Big Four’ accountants were deemed 
to endure a gruelling rite of passage, which would cause people either to leave, or to 
consider themselves unsuitable for a Big Four firm. For example, a female business 
owner we interviewed pointed out that she would never have made it in a large firm, 
and because she was married with children, she didn’t ‘fit the mould’.   
Despite accountants in smaller firms reflecting on the long working hours of the 
Big Four, we found that this work structure had carried over into firms of all sizes, 
where it was quite normal for small and medium-sized firms to ‘work twelve hours a 
day and only charge seven’, to take work home in the evenings, and to work six day 
weeks. Doxa works through ‘analogical reproduction’ and ‘mimetic representation’ 
(Throop and Murphy, 2002), a practical sense that leads to the taken-for-grantedness 
of the objective world. Despite the fact that many accountants had left the large firms 
to have more flexibility over their working hours, the structure of working continued, 
indicating a deeply embedded internalisation of the ‘natural order’ that was further 
promoted by small and medium-sized firms. Also, economically many medium-sized 
firms had to be ‘conveyor belts’ and ‘churn’ work over in order to remain profitable.  
Our final point questions whether the symbolic modes of domination operating 
in the UK accounting field are truly ‘misrecognised’ by the dominated owners of 
small and medium-sized firms. This was not always the case, as the narratives below 
indicate: 
All the accountants like myself, we take all the blame for these things as 
much as the big firms and it’s the big firms that are always doing it. 
They’re always bleating on about their professional indemnity insurance 
premium being really high. Well don’t be negligent and you won’t be 
sued. Don’t hide things the way you’re hiding them or you’ll be sued. I do 
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think it [scandals such as Enron] has damaged the reputation of 
accountants. (Owner, Small Accounting Practice) 
 
I do think about it when I look into the future, you know, accountancy 
services. The big firms seem to be strangling everything. I mean they 
would never admit to it but the big firms, they’re the ones who pushed for 
audit deregulation, you know, that are pushing for all sorts of things 
because they’re so greedy and they want everything. (Partner, Small 
Accounting Practice) 
 
Symbolic power emphasises the way in which social agents, by virtue of their 
socialisation and historical struggles, come to accept the categories and symbolic 
systems which, in turn, are imposed on them. Symbolic violence can be perceived as 
the effects of symbolic power when it results in groups being systematically denied 
the recognition enjoyed by others (Crossley, 2005). Whilst the narrative above implies 
recognition, the state of compliance with modes of symbolic violence is not wholly 
unconscious, nor “a state of voluntary servitude granted by a conscious deliberate act” 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 171). It is therefore possible for the victims and the perpetrators of 
symbolic violence to have some ability to recognise signals and their social meaning, 
to engage in cognitive struggles, but then to misrecognise the effect of this power.  
In terms of resisting symbolic violence, Bourdieu writes that recognition is not 
in itself enough: “If it is quite illusory to believe that symbolic violence can be 
overcome with the weapons of consciousness and will alone, this is because the effect 
and conditions of its efficacy are durably and deeply embedded in the body in the 
form of dispositions” (2001: 39). The historical trajectory of the UK accounting field 
and the emergent, hierarchical social structure severely constrain the space of 
available positions for organisational actors, and this becomes durably inscribed in the 
bodies of the dominated. This inscribed structure consequently seems naturally 
caused, with limited possibilities of change, which means that irrespective of some 
level of recognition, the dominated do not see possibilities for change or resistance. 
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Furthermore, the dominated instead act in complicity with it and promote it, through 
exercising their habitus as a structuring structure: even in circumstances of resistance, 
this tends to reflect earlier incarnations of the habitus rather than a revolutionary 
disposition. The historical and social processes of the disenchanted habitus, and the 
social space of the field colours the perception of the future and form beliefs that are 
manifested in the choices, hopes and expectations of small and medium-sized players.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have set out in this paper to unravel some of the social mechanisms which 
enable symbolic domination to operate in the field of professional accounting firms in 
the UK. The relationship of symbolic productions at the micro level to structural 
changes and objective mechanisms of domination at the macro level has also been 
further illuminated. We found that the illusio of the field enabled the Big Four to 
deploy euphemised discourse of ‘four to zero’ to garner regulatory changes that 
favoured their interests. Subsequently, objective mechanisms of legislative and 
regulatory changes in the UK altered the dynamics of the field, exerting smaller firms 
to what might be termed ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969), meaning the 
systematic ways in which social structures harm or otherwise disadvantage groups or 
individuals. These disabling constraints also exercised a symbolic violence, subjecting 
smaller firms to systematic monitoring and scrutiny of their practices. They are 
increasingly judged according to the standards set by the Big Four who are ‘quasi-
exclusive’ producers of accounting and auditing standards and the de facto voice of 
the profession (Ramirez, 2009). Being singled out for criticism in this way imprinted 
itself on the habitus of professionals working in small firms, internalised as a sense of 
inadequacy and fear.  
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As well as identifying the Big Four as agents of domination, we have also shed 
light on how institutions such as banks are complicit in generating symbolic power for 
the Big Four, through establishing ‘rites’ that privilege these firms and consecrate 
their legitimacy. Professional institutes also contribute to symbolic productions of 
domination by socialising and categorising their members, so that existing power 
relations and structural transformations to the professional and competitive field are 
seen as natural. Both banks and professional institutes have symbolic power, the 
authority and the perceived legitimacy, to name, classify and categorise accounting 
firms. The degree of control the Big Four exert on these actors means they can rely on 
their support and this, importantly, renders their domination less visible. As Malsch 
and Gendron (2013) point out, the Big Four firms need to balance differing logics in 
the accounting field, by supporting their commercial interests and economic 
domination on the one hand, whilst satisfying the demands made by professional 
logics on the other.  
 By exploring the role of the habitus, we have determined instances where 
agents contribute towards, and sometimes resist, symbolic productions of domination. 
Smaller practices are able to resist structural imperatives to stop auditing, and to reject 
micro-level socialisation initiatives aiming to reclassify them as ‘business advisors’. 
This demonstrates the relative autonomy of the habitus, as the conditions of its 
formation, in a field where being a ‘traditional’ professional accountant and practicing 
audit was valued, can mitigate its transformation. However, without being overly 
deterministic the habitus often adjusts to and reproduces the conditions of the field, 
and our analysis presented evidence of these adjustments and how they had impacted 
on the practices of smaller firms.  
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Our understanding of symbolic power and symbolic violence has become more 
fine-grained by considering the nature of ‘misrecognition’ in our study. Our field of 
interest has a pronounced and well-documented hierarchical divide between the Big 
Four and the remaining firms, which makes it unlikely that dominated agents will not 
be conscious, to some degree, of their subjugation. Symbolic power, however, is 
misrecognised because it operates through institutionalised mechanisms that fix 
values to boundaries, categories and practices, and which inculcate a belief in that 
value. When you examine how these objective mechanisms have emerged, you find 
that the Big Four, by virtue of the history of symbolic struggles in the field that has 
generated its particular doxa and illusio, are able to use euphemisation to enact these 
mechanisms in ways that are socially recognised as legitimate. Similarly, whilst small 
firms may recognise the domination of the Big Four, they do not recognise that these 
objective mechanisms, ‘rites of institution’ and processes of socialisation 
systematically reassert the dominance of the Big Four in hidden ways. The outcome 
of symbolic violence is that its victims feel devalued and stigmatised in the field of 
UK accounting firms, yet their perception of the ‘space of possibles’ within the 
structure of the field is so limited that it creates a ‘disenchanted habitus’. 
We examined recent challenges made to the dominance of the Big Four in the 
House of Lord’s enquiry, where dissatisfaction with the ‘four to zero’ threat was 
raised, and the complicity of other institutions in their power was questioned. In terms 
of possibilities for resistance and change, Bourdieu writes that political and economic 
crises are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the questioning of doxa to arise 
within a specific community (1977: 169).	  The overall market dominance and 
concentration of the Big Four had been apparent for many years in the UK, but the 
severity of the 2008 financial crisis placed a critical spotlight on the Big Four and has 
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made competition in the audit industry a contentious political issue. In the House of 
Lords inquiry, we found explicit references to forms of symbolic power and symbolic 
violence that were emblematic of our findings in the UK context. It remains to be 
seen whether this most recent challenge to dominance of the Big Four will result in 
significant changes; however it is worth noting that no representatives from small 
practices were asked to take part in the inquiry.  
The next stage in the UK context will involve final recommendations being 
released from the ongoing Competition Commission inquiry. It will be worthwhile 
studying the role of the Big Four in determining their severity: in the recent European 
Commission inquiry, their lobbying efforts have apparently been ‘extreme’ (Maher, 
2012). Our findings indicate that for various stakeholders in the audit market the 
arguments for sustaining the Big Four have diminished, and for some prominent 
commentators, there should be more fundamental changes to the audit function and 
the potential break-up of the large accounting firms. The quality of their work has 
been criticised, with accusations of complacency, a lack of scepticism and recognition 
of their repeated efforts to push at the edge of ethical standards. In light of these 
criticisms, history suggests the Big Four are likely to return to discourses of 
professional orthodoxy, whilst reinvigorating the micro-mechanisms that support their 
economic and symbolic domination (Malsch and Gendron, 2013). 
There are a number of limitations of this study: the comparability of the 
interviews conducted with partners, the potential biases of these informants’ 
narratives, and the fact that the data used from the House of Lords enquiry was 
collected with its own aims and objectives, rather than those of this study. Against 
this, however, we took necessary measures to ensure the trustworthiness of our 
research design and analysis, and the inclusion of the House of Lords data 
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undoubtedly improved our understanding of the phenomenon through adding a 
temporal dimension and allowing us to include the perspectives of a wider range of 
stakeholders in the accounting field. Our findings are also based explicitly on the UK 
accounting field, and thus not directly transferable to other national contexts, nor the 
wider international field of professional accounting.  
To conclude, from a theoretical perspective, this paper contributes to emerging 
conceptualisations of the mechanisms through which symbolic domination, symbolic 
power and symbolic violence are enacted (Kerr and Robinson, 2012), and responds to 
calls for the application of Bourdieu’s system of thought to the accounting field at a 
macro and micro level (Malsch et al., 2011). Our contextually grounded empirical 
data collection, involving both dominant and dominated agents, enabled us to capture 
the relational dynamics and nuances of their dispositions regarding taken for granted 
assumptions in the field. We reveal how the mechanisms of symbolic domination, 
namely euphemisation, rites of institution and socialisation, operate through various 
agents in the field. At a structural level symbolic power becomes institutionalised into 
objective mechanisms that can change the capital structure and habitus of field 
members. Symbolic violence can emerge from both micro mechanisms and macro 
level phenomena, when it denies recognition to smaller firms whose disenchanted 
dispositions misrecognise the underlying symbolic power as arbitrary.  
We see a number of avenues for future research emerging from our findings. 
We identified three key mechanisms that were associated with prominent themes in 
our data, for instance, rites of institution relating to the practices of banks, but we are 
hopeful that further empirical examples relating to each mechanism could be 
uncovered in future studies. Longitudinal research might try to examine whether the 
present crisis and responses to it mirror those seen previously, for instance, in the 
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discourses and regulatory changes that emerged after Andersen’s exit. Our own 
findings about the micro mechanisms of symbolic productions could be compared 
with the symbolic systems of domination in different contexts, particularly ones 
where the Big Four are less structurally powerful. Given that trust in banking and 
financial elites has been severely fractured by recent events (Arnold, 2009; Humphrey 
et al., 2009; Kerr and Robinson, 2012), it would be fruitful to further define and 
follow the dynamics of illusio and doxa in the field, which are increasingly brought 
into question. We think it would be interesting to further explore the degree to which 
members of the accounting field remain committed to the ‘rules of the game’ and to 
assess the damage that has been done to the profession, in terms of trust and its 
perceived legitimacy. On a broader note, research could try to explore more 
fundamental heterodox challenges that emerge regarding the usefulness of external 
audit as a trust-engendering technology (Power, 1999). We believe there is scope for 
further use of Bourdieu’s system of thought to further explore the nature of the 
accounting habitus and to shed further light on power dynamics and modes of 
domination in the accounting field.  
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